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Abstract
We propose a new variant of the group activity selection prob-
lem (GASP), where the agents are placed on a social network
and activities can only be assigned to connected subgroups.
We show that if multiple groups can simultaneously engage
in the same activity, finding a stable outcome is easy as long
as the network is acyclic. In contrast, if each activity can be
assigned to a single group only, finding stable outcomes be-
comes intractable, even if the underlying network is very sim-
ple: the problem of determining whether a given instance of a
GASP admits a Nash stable outcome turns out to be NP-hard
when the social network is a path, a star, or if the size of each
connected component is bounded by a constant. On the other
hand, we obtain fixed-parameter tractability results for this
problem with respect to the number of activities.
Introduction
Companies assign their employees to different departments,
large decision-making bodies split their members into expert
committees, and university faculty form research groups: di-
vision of labor, and thus group formation, is everywhere.
For a given assignment of agents to activities (such as man-
agement, product development, or marketing) to be success-
ful, two considerations are particularly important: the agents
need to be capable to work on their activity, and they should
be willing to cooperate with other members of their group.
Many relevant aspects of this setting are captured by the
group activity selection problem (GASP), introduced by Dar-
mann et al. (2012). In GASP players have preferences over
pairs of the form (activity, group size). The intuition behind
this formulation is that certain tasks are best performed in
small or large groups, and agents may differ in their prefer-
ences over group sizes; however, they are indifferent about
other group members’ identities. In the analysis of GASP,
desirable outcomes correspond to stable and/or optimal as-
signments of players to activities, i.e., assignments that are
resistant to player deviations and/or maximize the total wel-
fare. In the work of Darmann et al. (2012), players are as-
sumed to have approval preferences, and a particular focus
is placed on individually rational assignments with the maxi-
mum number of participants; subsequently, Darmann (2015)
investigated a model where players submit ranked ballots.
However, the basic model of GASP ignores the relation-
ships among the agents: Do they know each other? Are their
working styles and personalities compatible? Typically, we
cannot afford to ask each agent about her preferences over
all pairs of the form (coalition, activity), as the number of
possible coalitions grows quickly with the number of agents.
A more practical alternative is to adopt the ideas of Myerson
(1977) and assume that the relationships among the agents
are encoded by a social network, i.e., an undirected graph
where nodes correspond to players and edges represent com-
munication links between them; one can then require that
each group is connected with respect to this graph.
In this paper we extend the basic model of GASP to
take into account the agents’ social network. We formu-
late several notions of stability for this setting, including
Nash stability and core stability, and study the complex-
ity of computing stable outcomes in our model. These no-
tions of stability are inspired by the hedonic games litera-
ture (Aziz and Savani 2016) and were applied in the GASP
setting by Darmann et al. (2012) and Darmann (2015).
Now, hedonic games on social networks were recently
considered by Igarashi and Elkind (2016), who showed that
if the underlying network is acyclic, stable outcomes are
guaranteed to exist and some of the problems known to
be computationally hard for the unrestricted setting become
polynomial-time solvable. We obtain a similar result for
GASP, but only if several groups of agents can simultane-
ously engage in the same activity, i.e., if the activities are
copyable. In contrast, we show that if each activity can
be assigned to at most one coalition, finding a stable out-
come is hard even if the underlying network is very simple.
Specifically, checking the existence of Nash stable or core
stable outcomes turns out to be NP-hard even for very re-
stricted classes of graphs, including paths, stars, and graphs
with constant-size connected components. We believe that
this result is remarkable since, in the context of cooperative
games, such restricted networks usually enable one to de-
sign efficient algorithms for computing stable solutions (see,
e.g., Chalkiadakis, Greco, and Markakis 2016; Elkind 2014;
Igarashi and Elkind 2016).
Given these hardness results, we switch to the fixed pa-
rameter tractability paradigm. In the context of GASP, a par-
ticularly relevant parameter is the number of activities: gen-
erally speaking, we expect the number of players to be con-
siderably larger than the number of available activities. We
show that for the restricted classes of networks used in our
Complexity (general case) few activities (FPT wrt p) copyable activities
Nash stability trees NP-c. (Thm 6) poly time (Thm 5)
paths NP-c. (Thm 6) O∗(4pn2) (Thm 9) poly time (Thm 5)
stars NP-c. (Thm 7) O∗(2ppp+1n logn) (Thm 11) poly time (Thm 5)
small components NP-c. (Thm 8) O∗(pc8pkn2) (Thm 10)
core stability trees NP-c. (Thm 12) poly time (Thm 4)
paths NP-c. (Thm 12) poly time (Thm 4)
stars NP-c. (Thm 12) poly time (Thm 4)
small components NP-c. (Thm 12) O∗(pc+18pkn2) (Thm 13)
Table 1: Overview of our complexity results. Here, n is the number of players, p is the number of activities, and c is a bound
on the size of the connected components. The NP-completeness results for small components hold even for c = 4 for Nash
stability and for c = 3 for core stability.
hardness proofs (i.e., paths, stars, and graphs with small con-
nected components) finding a Nash stable outcome is in FPT
with respect to the number of activities; some of our results
extend to the core stable outcomes and to somewhat more
general networks (though not to arbitrary networks). Our re-
sults are summarized in Table 1.
Preliminaries
For s ∈ N, let [s] = {1, 2, . . . , s}. An instance of the Group
Activity Selection Problem (GASP) is given by a finite set of
players N = [n], a finite set of activities A = A∗ ∪ {a∅}
whereA∗ = {a1, a2, . . . , ap} and a∅ is the void activity, and
a profile (i)i∈N of complete and transitive preference rela-
tions over the set of alternativesX = A∗×[n]∪{(a∅, 1)}. In-
tuitively, a∅ corresponds to staying alone and doing nothing;
multiple agents can make that choice independently from
each other.
We refer to subsets S ⊆ N of players as coalitions. We
say that two non-void activities a and b are equivalent if
for every player i ∈ N and every ℓ ∈ [n] it holds that
(a, ℓ) ∼i (b, ℓ). A non-void activity a ∈ A∗ is called copy-
able if A∗ contains at least n activities that are equivalent to
a (including a itself). We say that player i ∈ N approves an
alternative (a, k) if (a, k) ≻i (a∅, 1).
An outcome of a GASP is an assignment of activities A to
playersN , i.e., a mapping π : N → A. Given an assignment
π : N → A and a non-void activity a ∈ A∗, we denote by
πa = { i ∈ N | π(i) = a } the set of players assigned
to a. Also, if π(i) 6= a∅, we denote by πi = {i} ∪ { j ∈
N | π(j) = π(i)} the set of players assigned to the same
activity as player i ∈ N ; we set πi = {i} if π(i) = a∅. An
assignment π : N → A of a GASP is individually rational
(IR) if for every player i ∈ N with π(i) 6= a∅ we have
(π(i), |πi|) i (a∅, 1). A coalition S ⊆ N and an activity
a ∈ A∗ strongly block an assignment π : N → A if πa ⊆ S
and (a, |S|) ≻i (π(i), |πi|) for all i ∈ S. An assignment
π : N → A of a GASP is called core stable (CR) if it is
individually rational, and there is no coalition S ⊆ N and
activity a ∈ A∗ such that S and a strongly block π. Given an
assignment π : N → A of a GASP, a player i ∈ N is said to
have an NS-deviation to activity a ∈ A∗ if (a, |πa| + 1) ≻i
(π(i), |πi|), that is, if i would prefer to join the group πa. An
assignment π : N → A of a GASP is called Nash stable
(NS) if it is individually rational and no player i ∈ N has an
NS-deviation to some a ∈ A∗.
Our Model
We now define a group activity selection problem where
communication structure among players is restricted by an
undirected graph.
Definition 1. An instance of the Group Activity Selection
Problem with graph structure (gGASP) is given by an in-
stance (N, (i)i∈N , A) of a GASP and a set of communica-
tion links between players L ⊆ { {i, j} | i, j ∈ N ∧ i 6= j }.
A coalition S ⊆ N is said to be feasible if S is connected
in the graph (N,L). An outcome of a gGASP is a feasible as-
signment π : N → A such that πi is a feasible coalition for
every i ∈ N . We adapt the definitions of stability concepts
to our setting as follows. We say that a deviation by a group
of players is feasible if the deviating coalition itself is feasi-
ble; a deviation by an individual player where player i joins
activity a is feasible if πa ∪ {i} is feasible. We modify the
definitions in the previous section by only requiring stabil-
ity against feasible deviations. Note that an ordinary GASP
(without graph structure) is equivalent to a gGASP where the
underlying graph (N,L) is complete.
In this paper, we will be especially interested in gGASPs
where (N,L) is acyclic. This restriction guarantees the exis-
tence of stable outcomes in many other cooperative game
settings. However, this is not the case for gGASPs: here,
both core and Nash stable outcomes may fail to exist, even
if (N,L) is a path or a star.
Example 2. Consider a gGASP with N = {1, 2, 3}, A∗ =
{a, b}, L = {{1, 2}, {2, 3}}, where preferences (i)i∈N
are given as follows:
1 : (b, 2) ≻1 (a, 3) ≻1 (a∅, 1)
2 : (a, 2) ≻2 (b, 2) ≻2 (a, 3) ≻2 (a∅, 1)
3 : (a, 3) ≻3 (b, 1) ≻3 (a, 2) ≻3 (a∅, 1)
There are only four individually rational feasible assign-
ments; in each case, π admits a strongly blocking feasible
coalition and activity. First, when π(1) = b, π(2) = b,
π(3) = a∅, the coalition {2, 3} together with activity a
strongly blocks π. Second, when π(1) = a∅, π(2) = a,
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π(3) = a, the coalition {3} together with activity b strongly
blocks π. Third, when π(1) = a∅, π(2) = a∅, π(3) = b, the
coalition {1, 2, 3} together with activity a strongly blocks π.
Finally, when π(1) = a, π(2) = a, and π(3) = a, the coali-
tion {1, 2} together with activity b strongly blocks π.
Similarly, a Nash stable outcome is not guaranteed to exist
even for gGASPs on paths.
Example 3 (Stalker game). Consider a two-player gGASP
where player 1 is happy to participate in any activity as long
as she is alone, and player 2 always wants to participate in an
activity with player 1. This instance admits no Nash stable
outcomes: if player 1 engages in an activity, then player 2
wants to join her coalition, causing player 1 to deviate to
another (possibly void) activity.
However, if all activities are copyable, we can effectively
treat gGASP as a hedonic game on a graph. In particular, we
can invoke a famous result of Demange (2004) concerning
the stability of non-transferable utility games on trees. Thus,
requiring all activities to be copyable allows us to circum-
vent the non-existence result for the core (Example 2). The
argument is constructive.
Theorem 4 (implicit in the work of Demange 2004). For
every gGASP where each activity a ∈ A∗ is copyable and
(N,L) is acyclic, a core stable feasible assignment exists
and can be found in time polynomial in p and n.
Now, the stalker game in Example 3 does not admit a Nash
stable outcome even if we make all activities copyable. How-
ever, for copyable activities we can still find a Nash stable
outcome in polynomial time if the social network is acyclic.
Theorem 5. Given an instance (N,A, (i)i∈N , L) of
gGASP where each activity a ∈ A∗ is copyable and the
graph (N,L) is acyclic, one can decide whether it admits a
Nash stable outcome in time polynomial in p and n.
Proof. If the input graph (N,L) is a forest, we can process
each of its connected components separately, so we assume
that (N,L) is a tree. We choose an arbitrary node as the
root and construct a rooted tree by orienting the edges in L
towards the leaves. Then, for each player i, each activity a
and each k ∈ [n] and t ∈ [k] we set fi((a, k), t) to true if
the following condition holds: there exists a feasible assign-
ment π for the subtree rooted at i where |πi| = t, π(i) = a,
each player in πi likes (a, k) at least as much as any alterna-
tive she can deviate to (including the void activity), and no
player who is not in πi has an NS-deviation. Otherwise, we
set fi((a, k), t) to false.
For each player i ∈ N , each alternative (a, k) ∈ X , and
each t ∈ [k], we initialize fi((a, k), t) to true if t = 1 and
i weakly prefers (a, k) to any alternative of size 1, and we
set fi((a, k), t) to false otherwise. Then, for i ∈ N from the
bottom to the root, we iterate through all the children of i
and update fi((a, k), t) one by one; more precisely, for each
child j of i and for t = k, . . . , 1, we set fi((a, k), t) to true
if there exists an x ∈ [t] such that both fi((a, k), x) and
fj((a, k), t − x) are true, or fi((a, k), t) is true and there
exists (b, ℓ) ∈ X such that fj((b, ℓ), ℓ) is true and neither
i nor j want to move across the “border”, i.e., (a, k) i
(b, ℓ + 1) and (b, ℓ) j (a, k + 1). It is easy to see that a
Nash stable assignment exists if and only if fr((a, k), k) is
true for some alternative (a, k) ∈ X , where r is the root
of the rooted tree. If this is the case, a Nash stable feasible
assignment can be found using dynamic programming.
Hardness Results for Nash Stability
We now move on to the case where each activity can be used
at most once. We will show that computing Nash stable out-
comes of gGASPs is NP-complete even when the underlying
network is a path, a star, or a graph with constant size con-
nected components. This problem is in NP for any social
network: given an assignment, we can easily check whether
it is Nash stable.
Our proof for paths is by reduction from a restricted ver-
sion of the NP-complete problem RAINBOW MATCHING.
Given a graph G, a proper edge coloring is a mapping
φ : E(G) → C where φ(e) 6= φ(e′) for all edges e, e′ such
that e 6= e′, e∩e′ 6= ∅. Without loss of generality, we assume
that φ is surjective. A properly edge-colored graph (G,φ) is
a graph together with a proper edge coloring. A matchingM
in an edge colored graph (G,φ) is called a rainbow matching
if all edges of M have different colors. An instance of RAIN-
BOW MATCHING is a graphG with a proper edge coloring φ
and an integer k. It is a “yes”-instance if G admits a rainbow
matching with at least k edges and a “no”-instance other-
wise. Le and Pfender (2014) show that RAINBOW MATCH-
ING remains NP-complete even for properly edge-colored
paths.
Theorem 6. Given an instance of gGASP whose underlying
graph is a path, it is NP-complete to determine whether it
has a Nash stable feasible assignment.
Proof. The hardness proof proceeds by a reduction from
PATH RAINBOW MATCHING.
Given an instance (G,φ, k) of PATH RAINBOW MATCH-
ING where the set of colors is given by C where |C| = q,
we construct an instance of gGASP on a path as follows. We
create a vertex player v for each v ∈ V (G) and an edge
player e for each e ∈ E(G), and align them in the order con-
sistent with E(G); specifically, we let NG = V (G) ∪ E(G)
and LG = { {v, e} | v ∈ e ∈ E(G) }. To the right of the
graph (NG, LG), we attach a path that consists of “garbage
collectors” {g1, g2, . . . , gq−k} and q copies (Nc, Lc) of the
stalker game where Nc = {c1, c2} and Lc = {{c1, c2}} for
each c ∈ C. We introduce a color activity c for each color
c ∈ C. Each vertex player v approves color activities φ(e) of
its adjacent edges e with size 3; each edge player e approves
the color activity φ(e) of its color with size 3; each garbage
collector gi approves any color activity c with size 1; finally,
for players in Nc, c ∈ C, player c1 approves its color activity
c with size 1, whereas player c2 approves c with size 2.
We will now argue that G contains a rainbow matching of
size at least k if and only if there exists a Nash stable feasible
assignment.
Suppose that there exists a rainbow matching M of size
k. We construct a feasible assignment π where for each
e = {u, v} ∈ M we set π(e) = π(u) = π(v) = φ(e),
each garbage collector gi, i ∈ [q − k], is arbitrarily assigned
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to one of the remaining q−k color activities, and the remain-
ing players are assigned to the void activity. The assignment
π is Nash stable, since every garbage collector as well as
every edge or vertex player assigned to a color activity are
allocated their top alternative, and no remaining player has
an NS feasible deviation.
Conversely, suppose that there is a Nash stable feasible
assignment π. Let M = { e ∈ E(G) | π(e) ∈ C }. We will
show that M is a rainbow matching of size at least k. To see
this, notice that π cannot allocate a color activity to a mem-
ber of Nc, since otherwise no feasible assignment would be
Nash stable. Further, at most q − k color activities are allo-
cated to the garbage collectors, which means that at least k
color activities should be assigned to vertex and edge play-
ers. The only individually rational way to do this is to select
triples of the form (u, e, v) where e = {u, v} ∈ E(G) and
assign to them their color activity φ(e). Thus, M is a rain-
bow matching of size at least k.
For gGASPs on stars we provide a reduction from the
NP-complete problem MINIMUM MAXIMAL MATCHING
(MMM). An instance of MMM is a graph G and a positive
integer k ≤ |E(G)|. It is a “yes”-instance if G admits a max-
imal matching with at most k edges, and a “no”-instance
otherwise. The problem remains NP-complete for bipartite
graphs (Demange and Ekim 2008).
Theorem 7. Given an instance of gGASP whose underlying
graph is a star, it is NP-complete to determine whether it has
a Nash stable feasible assignment.
Proof. To prove NP-hardness, we reduce from MMM on bi-
partite graphs. Given a bipartite graph (U, V,E) and an in-
teger k, we create a star with center c and |V | + 1 leaves:
one leaf for each vertex player v ∈ V plus one stalker
s. We introduce an activity u for each u ∈ U , and two
additional activities a and b. A player v ∈ V approves
(u, 1) for each activity u such that {u, v} ∈ E as well as
(a, |V | − k + 1) and prefers the former to the latter. That is,
(u, 1) ≻v (a, |V |− k+1) for every u ∈ U with {u, v} ∈ E;
v is indifferent among the activities associated with its neigh-
bors in the graph, that is, (u, 1) ∼v (u′, 1) for all u, u′ ∈ U
such that {u, v}, {u′, v} ∈ E. The center player c approves
both (a, |V | − k + 1) and (b, 1), and prefers the former to
the latter, i.e., (a, |V | − k + 1) ≻c (b, 1) ≻c (a∅, 1). Finally,
the stalker s only approves (b, 2).
We now show that G admits a maximal matching M with
at most k edges if and only if our instance of gGASP admits
a Nash stable assignment. Suppose that G admits a maximal
matching M with at most k edges. We construct a feasible
assignment π by setting π(v) = u for each {u, v} ∈ M ,
assigning |V | − k vertex players and the center to a, and
assigning the remaining players to the void activity. Clearly,
the center c has no incentive to deviate and no vertex player
in a singleton coalition wants to deviate to the coalition of
the center. Further, no vertex v has an NS-deviation to an
unused activity u, since if π admits such a deviation, this
would mean that M ∪ {u, v} forms a matching, a contradic-
tion with the maximality of M . Finally, the stalker player
has no incentive to deviate since the center player does not
play b. Hence, π is Nash stable.
Conversely, suppose that there exists a Nash stable feasi-
ble assignment π and let M = { {π(v), v} | v ∈ V ∧π(v) ∈
U }. We will show that M is a maximal matching of size
at most k. By Nash stability, the stalker player should not
have an incentive to deviate, and hence the center player and
|V | − k vertex players are assigned to activity a. It follows
that k vertex players are not assigned to a, and therefore
|M | ≤ k. Moreover, M is a matching since each vertex
player is assigned to at most one activity, and by individ-
ual rationality each activity can be assigned to at most one
player. Now suppose towards a contradiction that M is not
maximal, i.e., there exists an edge {u, v} ∈ E such that
M ∪ {u, v} is a matching. This would mean that under π no
player is assigned to u and v is assigned to the void activity;
hence, v has an NS-deviation to u, contradicting the Nash
stability of π.
In the analysis of cooperative games on social networks
one can usually assume that the social network is connected:
if this is not the case, each connected component can be pro-
cessed separately. This is also the case for gGASP as long as
all activities are copyable. However, if each activity can only
be used by a single group, different connected components
are no longer independent, as they have to choose from the
same pool of activities. Indeed, we will now show that the
problem of finding Nash stable outcomes remains NP-hard
even if the size of each connected component is at most four.
Our hardness proof for this problem proceeds by reduction
from a restricted version of 3SAT. Specifically, we consider
(3,B2)-SAT: in this version of 3SAT each clause contains ex-
actly 3 literals, and each variable occurs exactly twice pos-
itively and twice negatively. This problem is known to be
NP-complete (Berman, Karpinski, and Scott 2003).
Theorem 8. Given an instance of gGASP where each con-
nected component of the underlying graph has size at most 4,
it is NP-complete to determine whether it has a Nash stable
feasible assignment.
Proof. We reduce from (3,B2)-SAT. Consider a formula φ
with variable set X and clause set C, where for each vari-
able x ∈ X we write x1 and x2 for the two positive oc-
currences of x, and x¯1 and x¯2 for the two negative occur-
rences of x. For each x ∈ X , we introduce four players
x1, x2, x¯1, x¯2, which correspond to the four occurrences of
x. For each clause c ∈ C, we introduce one stalker sc and
three other players c1, c2, and c3. The network (N,L) con-
sists of one component for each clause—a star with center sc
and leaves c1, c2, and c3—and of two components for each
variable x ∈ X consisting of a single edge each: {x1, x2}
and {x¯1, x¯2}. Thus, the size of each component of this graph
is at most 4.
For each x ∈ X we introduce one variable activity x, two
positive literal activities x1 and x2, two negative literal ac-
tivities x¯1 and x¯2, and two further activities ax and a¯x. Also,
we introduce an activity c for each clause c ∈ C. Thus,
A∗ =
⋃
x∈X
{x, x1, x2, x¯1, x¯2, ax, a¯x} ∪ C.
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For each x ∈ X the preferences of the positive literal players
x1 and x2 are given as follows:
x1 : (x, 2) ≻ (x, 1) ≻ (x1, 1) ≻ (x2, 2) ≻ (ax, 1) ≻ (a∅, 1),
x2 : (x, 2) ≻ (x2, 1) ≻ (x1, 2) ≻ (ax, 2) ≻ (a∅, 1).
Similarly, for each x ∈ X the preferences of the negative
literal players x¯1 and x¯2 are given as follows:
x¯1 : (x, 2) ≻ (x, 1) ≻ (x¯1, 1) ≻ (x¯2, 2) ≻ (a¯x, 1) ≻ (a∅, 1),
x¯2 : (x, 2) ≻ (x¯2, 1) ≻ (x¯1, 2) ≻ (a¯x, 2) ≻ (a∅, 1).
In a Nash stable assignment none of the activities ax, a¯x, a∅
can be assigned to literal players. Hence, there are only two
possible cases: first, both players x1 and x2 are assigned to
x, and players x¯1 and x¯2 are assigned to x¯1 and x¯2, respec-
tively; second, both players x¯1 and x¯2 are assigned to x, and
players x1 and x2 are assigned to x1 and x2, respectively.
For players in Nc where c = ℓc1 ∨ ℓc2 ∨ ℓc3, the preferences
are given by
cr : (ℓ
c
r, 1) ≻ (c, 2) ≻ (a∅, 1), (r = 1, 2, 3)
sc : (ℓ
c
1, 2) ∼ (ℓ
c
2, 2) ∼ (ℓ
c
3, 2) ∼ (c, 2) ≻ (a∅, 1).
That is, players c1, c2, and c3 prefer to engage alone in their
approved literal activity, whereas sc wants to join one of the
adjacent leaves whenever π(sc) = a∅ and that leaf is as-
signed a literal activity; however, the leaf would then prefer
to switch to the void activity. This means that if there exists
a Nash stable outcome, at least one of the literal activities
must be used outside of Nc, and some leaf and the stalker
sc must be assigned to activity c. We will show that φ is sat-
isfied by some assignment if and only if there exists a Nash
stable outcome.
Suppose that there exists a truth assignment that satisfies
φ. First, for each variable x that is set to True, we assign pos-
itive literal activities x1 and x2 to the positive literal players
x1 and x2, respectively, and assign x to the negative literal
players x¯1 and x¯2. For each variable x that is set to False,
we assign negative literal activities x¯1 and x¯2 to the negative
literal players x¯1 and x¯2, respectively, and assign x to the
positive literal players x1 and x2. Note that this procedure
uses at least one of the literal activities ℓc1, ℓc2 and ℓc3 of each
clause c ∈ C, since the given truth assignment satisfies φ.
Then, for each clause c ∈ C, we select a player cj whose ap-
proved activity ℓcj has been assigned to some literal player,
and assign cj and the stalker to c, and the rest of the clause
players to their approved literal activity if it is not used yet,
and to the void activity otherwise. It is easy to see that the
resulting assignment π is Nash stable.
Conversely, suppose that there exists a Nash stable feasi-
ble assignment π. By Nash stability, for each variablex ∈ X ,
either a pair of positive literal players x1 and x2 or a pair of
negative literal players x¯1 and x¯2 should be assigned to the
corresponding pair of literal activities; in addition, for each
clause c ∈ C, the stalker sc and one of the players c1, c2,
and c3 should engage in the activity c, thereby implying that
the approved literal activity of the respective leaf should be
assigned to some literal players. Then, take the truth assign-
ment that sets the variable x to True if its positive literal
players x1 and x2 are assigned to positive literal activities
x1 and x2; otherwise, x is set to False. This assignment can
be easily seen to satisfy φ.
Fixed Parameter Tractability
In the instances of gGASP that are created in our hardness
proofs, the number of activities is unbounded. It is thus nat-
ural to wonder what can be said when there are few activ-
ities to be assigned. We will show that for each of the re-
stricted families of graphs considered in the previous sec-
tion, gGASP is fixed parameter tractable with respect to the
number of activities.
The basic idea behind each of the three algorithms is that
we fix a set of activities that will be assigned to the players,
and for each possible subset B ⊆ A∗ of activities we check
whether there exists a stable assignment using the activities
from that subset only. Our algorithms for paths and for small
components use dynamic programming, allowing us to build
up the set B step-by-step.
We begin by giving the dynamic program that works for
paths. We consider the path from left to right, and, for each
initial segment of the path, guess a set B′ ⊆ B of activities
that will be used in that segment of players. For each choice
of these sets, we keep track of whether it is possible to con-
struct an assignment that does not admit an NS-deviation
within the initial segment under consideration.
Theorem 9. There exists an algorithm that, given an in-
stance of gGASP whose underlying graph is a path, checks
whether this instance has a Nash stable feasible assignment
and finds one if it exists, and runs in time O(4ppn(p+ n))
Proof. Suppose that N = [n] and L = { {i, i + 1} | i =
1, 2, . . . , n − 1 }. First, we guess a subset B ⊆ A∗ of non-
void activities to be used; there are 2p possibilities, so we
try them all. For each B, we solve the problem by dynamic
programming. For each i ∈ [n], each B′ ⊆ B, each alterna-
tive (a, k) ∈ B′ × [n] ∪ {(a∅, 1)}, and each number t ∈ [k],
we let fi(B,B′, (a, k), t) be true if there exists a feasible as-
signment π : [i]→ B′ ∪ {a∅} with the following properties:
• each activity in B′ is assigned to some player in [i];
• the t players in {i− t+ 1, i− t+ 2, . . . , i} belong to the
same group as i and weakly prefer (a, k) to (b, 1) for each
b ∈ A \B;
• player i − t + 1 weakly prefers (a, k) to the coalition he
would end up in by joining his predecessor;
• player i−tweakly prefers his alternative at π to (a, k+1);
and
• the rest of the players in {1, 2, . . . , i − t} weakly prefer
their alternative under π to engaging alone in any of the
activities in A \ B and have no NS feasible deviation to
activities in B′.
Otherwise, we let fi(B,B′, (a, k), t) be false.
For player i = 1, if B′ = {a}, t = 1, and player 1 weakly
prefers (a, k) to each alternative (b, 1) such that b ∈ A \ B,
we set f1(B,B′, (a, k), t) to true and otherwise to false.
For i = 2, . . . , n, fi(B,B′, (a, k), t) is true only if player
i weakly prefers (a, k) to (b, 1) for each b ∈ A \ B, and in
addition, either
• t = 1, and players i and i− 1 can be separated from each
other, i.e., there exists (b, ℓ) ∈ X such that fi−1(B,B′ \
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{a}, (b, ℓ), ℓ) is true, (b, ℓ) i−1 (a, k + 1) and (b, ℓ +
1) i (a, k), or
• t ≥ 2 and fi−1(B,B′, (a, k), t− 1) is true.
If the condition above is not satisfied, then
fi(B,B
′, (a, k), t) is set to false. It is not difficult to
see that a Nash stable assignment exists if and only if
fn(B,B, (a, k), k) is true for some alternative (a, k) ∈ X
and some B ⊆ A∗. The bound on the running time is
immediate.
Our algorithm for networks with small connected compo-
nents is similar to the dynamic program we just discussed.
We essentially pretend that the components are arranged in
a “path”, and run the algorithm as before. Within each com-
ponent, we have enough time to consider all possible as-
signments, allowing us to treat components as “big vertices”.
The resulting algorithm is FPT with respect to the combined
parameter p+ c, where c is a bound on the size of the com-
ponents of the network.
Theorem 10. There exists an algorithm that given an in-
stance of gGASP on a graph with constant-size connected
components checks whether it has a Nash stable feasible as-
signment, finds one if it exists, and runs in time O(pc8pkn2),
where c is the maximum size of a connected component and
k is the number of connected components.
Proof. We give a dynamic programming algorithm. Sup-
pose our graph (N,L) has k connected components
(N1, L1), (N2, L2), . . . , (Nk, Lk). For each i ∈ [k], each set
B ⊆ A∗ of activities assigned to N , and each set B′ ⊆ B
of activities assigned to
⋃i
j=1Nj , we let fi(B,B′) denote
whether there is such an assignment that gives rise to a Nash
stable outcome. Specifically, fi(B,B′) is true if and only
if there exists an individually rational feasible assignment
π :
⋃i
j=1Nj → A such that
• π uses exactly the activities in B′, i.e., πb 6= ∅ for all
b ∈ B′ and πb = ∅ for all b ∈ A∗ \B′, and
• no player in
⋃i
j=1Nj has an NS-deviation to an activity
in B′ or to an activity in A∗ \B.
For i = 1, each B ⊆ A∗, and each B′ ⊆ B, we com-
pute the value of f1(B,B′) by trying all possible mappings
π : N1 → B′∪{a∅}, and checking whether it is an individu-
ally rational feasible assignment using all activities inB′ and
such that no player inN1 has an NS-deviation to a used activ-
ity in B′ or an unused activity in A∗ \B. For i = 2, 3, . . . , k,
each B ⊆ A∗, and B′ ⊆ B, we set fi(B,B′) to true if there
exists a bipartition of B′ into P and Q such that fi−1(B,P )
is true and there exists a mapping π : Ni → Q ∪ {a∅}
such that π is an individually rational feasible assignment
using all the activities in Q, and no player in Ni has an NS-
deviation to a used activity in Q or an unused activity in
A∗\B. It is not difficult to see that a Nash stable solution ex-
ists if and only if fk(B,B) is true for some B ⊆ A∗. If this
is the case, such a stable feasible assignment can be found us-
ing standard dynamic programming techniques. The bound
on the running time is immediate.
For networks given by star graphs, we use a different tech-
nique to obtain an FPT result, namely (derandomized) color
coding. The algorithm begins by guessing the alternative
(a, k) assigned to the center player. Next, we again guess the
precise set B of activities in use by the players not assigned
to alternative (a, k). We then randomly color leaf players by
activities in B (or by the void activity), rejecting colorings
that are infeasible or must lead to NS deviations. Crucially,
the latter task reduces to straightforward counting questions,
which allows this method to succeed.
Theorem 11. There exists an algorithm that given an in-
stance of gGASP on a star checks whether it has a Nash
stable feasible assignment, finds one if it exists, and runs in
time O(2ppp+1n logn).
Proof. For each (a, k) ∈ X and B ⊆ A∗ \ {a}, we will
check whether there exists a Nash stable assignment such
that the center c and k − 1 leaves engage in a, exactly |B|
leaf players are assigned to activities in B, and the rest of
the players are assigned to the void activity. We will check
whether the center player c weakly prefers (a, k) to every
alternative (b, ℓ) ∈ B × {2} ∪ (A \ B) × {1}. If this is
the case, we will proceed; otherwise, there is no Nash stable
outcome with the above properties, since the center player
would have an incentive to deviate.
Now we will check whether there is an assignment of ac-
tivities in B to leaf players that gives rise to a Nash stable
outcome. To this end, we use the color-coding technique to
design a randomized algorithm. We ‘color’ each leaf player
using colors in B independently and uniformly at random.
Suppose that there exists a Nash stable assignment π as de-
scribed above. Then, the probability that the players who
engage in activities from B on their own (denote this set by
S) are assigned these activities by a coloring χ chosen at
random is |B|−|B|: there are |B|n−1 possible colorings, and
|B|n−1−|B| of them coincide with π on S. We can then de-
randomize our algorithm using a family of k-perfect hash
functions (Alon, Yuster, and Zwick 1995).
Now, fix a coloring χ : N \ {c} → B. We seek to assign
each player i ∈ N \ {c} to one of the activities, namely
either to a, to χ(i) ∈ B, or to a∅, in such a way that exactly
one agent of each color engages in the color activity and
k players including the center are assigned to a. We will
show that there exists a polynomial-time algorithm that finds
a Nash stable outcome compatible with χ, or determines that
no such assignment exists. For each b ∈ B, we denote by
Nb = { i ∈ N \ {c} | χ(i) = b } the set of players of color
b.
For each color b ∈ B, each i ∈ Nb, and ℓ = 0, 1, . . . , k−
1, we will first determine whether i can be assigned to b, and
exactly ℓ players in Nb can be assigned to activity a; we de-
note this subproblem by fb(i, ℓ). We initialize fb(i, ℓ) to true
if ℓ = 0, player i weakly prefers (b, 1) to every alternative
(b′, 1) such that b′ ∈ A \ B, and the players i and c can be
separated from each other, i.e., a = a∅ or i weakly prefers
(b, 1) to (a, k + 1). Otherwise, we set fb(i, ℓ) to false. We
then iterate through all the players j ∈ Nb \ {i} and update
fb(i, ℓ) one by one. Specifically, we set fb(i, ℓ) to true if
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• fb(i, ℓ−1) is true and player j can be assigned to a, i.e., j
weakly prefers (a, k) to every alternative (b′, 1) such that
b′ ∈ A \B; or
• fb(i, ℓ) is true and player j can be assigned to a∅, i.e., j
weakly prefers (a∅, 1) to every alternative (b′, 1) such that
b′ ∈ A \B and (a, k + 1).
Otherwise, we set fb(i, ℓ) to false.
Now, we will determine whether there are exactly ℓ play-
ers in N who can be engaged in a; we denote this subprob-
lem by f(ℓ). For each ℓ ∈ [k], we initialize f(ℓ) to true if
ℓ = 1 and f(ℓ) to false otherwise. Then, we iterate through
all the colors b ∈ B and update f(ℓ): for each b ∈ B and
each ℓ = k, k − 1, . . . , 1, we set f(ℓ) to true if there exists
x ∈ {0, 1, . . . , k − 1} such that fb(j, x) is true for some
j ∈ Nb and f(ℓ− x) is true; otherwise, we set f(ℓ) to false.
Finally, we reject the coloring if f(k) is false. It is clear
that the algorithm does not reject the coloring if there exists
a Nash stable feasible assignment that is compatible with χ.
We omit the proof for the bound on the running time.
Core stability
By adapting the reductions for Nash stability, we can show
that checking the existence of a core stable outcome is also
NP-hard. This result holds for all classes of graph families
that we have considered.
Theorem 12. Given an instance of gGASP whose underly-
ing graph is a path, a star, or has connected components
whose size is bounded by 3, it is NP-complete to determine
whether it has a core stable feasible assignment.
Proof. To verify that a given feasible assignment is core sta-
ble, it suffices to check that for every alternative (a, k) there
is no connected coalition with at least k players who strictly
prefer (a, k) to the alternative of their current coalition. For
the networks we consider this can be done in polynomial
time, and hence our problem is in NP. The hardness reduc-
tions are similar to the respective reductions for Nash stabil-
ity; essentially, we have to replace copies of the stalker game
with copies of the game with an empty core.
Paths We prove the hardness via a reduction from PATH
RAINBOW MATCHING. Given such an instance (G,φ, k)
where |C| = q, we first construct the graph (NG, LG) as de-
fined in the proof of Theorem 6. To the right of the graph
(NG, LG), we attach a path that consists of garbage col-
lectors {g1, g2, . . . , gq−k} and q copies (Nc, Lc) of empty-
core instances of Example 2 where Nc = {c1, c2, c3} and
Lc = {{c1, c2}, {c2, c3}} for each c ∈ C. For each color
c ∈ C, we introduce a color activity c, and introduce addi-
tional activity ac, which will be used only among players in
Nc; specifically, we set A =
⋃
c∈C{c, ac} ∪ {a∅}.
Each vertex player v ∈ V (G), edge player e ∈ E(G) and
garbage collector gi has the same approval preference as in
the proof of Theorem 6. The preference for players in Nc
(c ∈ C) is cyclic and given by
c1 : (c, 2) ≻ (ac, 3) ≻ (a∅, 1),
c2 : (ac, 2) ≻ (c, 2) ≻ (ac, 3) ≻ (a∅, 1), and
c3 : (ac, 3) ≻ (c, 1) ≻ (ac, 2) ≻ (a∅, 1).
We will now argue that G contains a rainbow matching of
size at least k if and only if there exists a core stable feasible
assignment.
Suppose that there exists a rainbow matching M of size
k. We construct a feasible assignment π where for each e =
{u, v} ∈ M we set π(e) = π(u) = π(v) = φ(e), each
garbage collector gi, i ∈ [q−k], is arbitrarily assigned to one
of the remaining q − k color activities, each triple of c1, c2,
and c3 (c ∈ C) is assigned to ac, and the remaining players
are assigned to the void activity. The assignment π is core
stable, since every garbage collector as well as every edge or
vertex player assigned to a color activity are allocated their
top alternative, and no connected subsets of the remaining
players together with color activity can strongly block π.
Conversely, suppose that there is a core stable feasible as-
signment π : N → A. Let M = { e ∈ E(G) | π(e) ∈ C }.
We will show that M is a rainbow matching of size at least
k. To see this, notice that at π, all the color activities should
be played outside Nc’s, since otherwise no core stable as-
signment would exist as we have seen in Example 2. Fur-
ther, at most q − k colour activities are played among the
garbage collectors, which means that at least k colour activ-
ities should be assigned to vertex and edge players. Again,
the only individual rational way to do this is to select triples
of the form (u, e, v) where e = {u, v} ∈ E(G) and assign to
them their colour activity φ(e); thus, M is a rainbow match-
ing of size at least k.
Stars We reduce from a restricted variant of MMM where
the graph is a bipartite graph.
Given a bipartite graph (U, V,E) and an integer k, we
create a star with center c and the |V | + 2 leaves: one leaf
for each vertex v ∈ V plus two other players s1 and s2. We
then introduce an activity u for each u ∈ U , and three other
simple activities a, x, and y.
A player v ∈ V approves (u, 1) for each u ∈ U such
that {u, v} ∈ E as well as (a, |V | − k + 1) and prefers
the former to the latter. That is, (u, 1) ≻v (a, |V | − k + 1)
for any u ∈ U with {u, v} ∈ E; v is indifferent among
activities associated with its neighbors in the graph, that is,
(u, 1) ∼v (u′, 1) for all u, u′ ∈ U such that {u, v}, {u′, v} ∈
E. The center player c strictly prefers (a, |V |−k+1) to any
other alternative, and has the same cyclic preferences over
the alternatives of x and y as in Example 2 together with
players s1 and s2, given by
s1 : (y, 2) ≻ (x, 3) ≻ (a∅, 1)
c : (a, |V | − k + 1) ≻ (x, 2) ≻ (y, 2) ≻ (x, 3) ≻ (a∅, 1)
s2 : (x, 3) ≻ (y, 1) ≻ (x, 2) ≻ (a∅, 1).
Here, s1’s (respectively, the center c and the player s2) pref-
erence corresponds to the one for player 1 (respectively,
player 2 and player 3) in Example 2. We will show that G
contains a maximal matching of size at most k if and only
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if there exists a core stable feasible assignment in a similar
manner to the previous proof.
Suppose that G admits a maximal matching M with at
most k edges. We construct a feasible assignment π by set-
ting π(v) = u for each {u, v} ∈ M , and assigning |V | − k
non-matched vertex players and the center to a, assigning s2
to y, and assigning the remaining players to the void activ-
ity. The center c is allocated to her top alternative, and hence
no connected subset of the three players s1, c and s2 together
with activity x, y, and z strongly blocks π. Further, no vertex
player v together with an unused vertex activity u strongly
blocks π, since if such a pair {u, v} existed, this would mean
that {u, v} is not included inM , and henceM∪{u, v} forms
a matching, which contradicts the maximality of M . Hence,
π is core stable.
Conversely, suppose that there exists a core stable feasible
assignment π and let M = { {π(v), v} | v ∈ V ∧ π(v) ∈
U }. We will show that M is a maximal matching of size
at most k. By core stability, the center player and |V | − k
vertex players are assigned to the activity a; otherwise, no
core stable outcome would exist as we have seen in Exam-
ple 2; thus, |M | ≤ k. Notice further that M is a matching
since each vertex player plays at most one activity, and by in-
dividual rationality each vertex activity should be assigned
to at most one player. Now suppose towards a contradiction
that M is not maximal, i.e., there exists an edge {u, v} ∈ E
such that u ∈ U , v ∈ V , and M ∪{u, v} is a matching. This
would mean that π assigns no player to u and no vertex activ-
ity to v, and hence the coalition {v} together with the vertex
activity u strongly blocks π, contradicting the stability of π.
Small Components We reduce from (3,B2)-SAT. Consider
a formula φ with variable set X and clause set C, where for
each variable x ∈ X we write x1 and x2 for the two positive
occurrences of x, and x¯1 and x¯2 for the two negative occur-
rences of x. Corresponding to the variable occurrences, we
introduce four players x1, x2, x¯1, and x¯2 for each variable
x ∈ X . We also introduce two other players x and x¯ for each
variable x ∈ X . For each clause c ∈ C, we introduce three
players c1, c2, and c3. The network consists of one compo-
nent for each clause c ∈ C: a star with center c2 and leaves
c1 and c3, and of two components for each variable x ∈ X :
a star with center x and leaves x1 and x2, and a star with cen-
ter x¯ and leaves x¯1 and x¯2. Hence, the size of each connected
component of this graph is at most 3. We then construct the
set of activities given by
A∗ =
⋃
x∈X
{x, x1, x2, x¯1, x¯2, ax, bx, a¯x, b¯x}.
For each x ∈ X , the preferences of the positive literal play-
ers x1 and x2 and the positive variable player x are given as
follows:
x1 : (x, 3) ∼ (x1, 1) ≻ (bx, 2) ≻ (ax, 3) ≻ (a∅, 1)
x2 : (x, 3) ∼ (x2, 1) ≻ (ax, 2) ≻ (bx, 2) ≻ (ax, 3) ≻ (a∅, 1)
x : (x, 3) ≻ (ax, 3) ≻ (bx, 1) ≻ (ax, 2) ≻ (a∅, 1)
Similarly, for each x ∈ X , the preferences of the negative
literal players x¯1 and x¯2, and the negative variable player x¯
are given as follows:
x¯1 : (x, 3) ∼ (x¯1, 1) ≻ (b¯x, 2) ≻ (a¯x, 2) ≻ (a∅, 1)
x¯2 : (x, 3) ∼ (x¯2, 1) ≻ (a¯x, 2) ≻ (b¯x, 2) ≻ (a¯x, 3) ≻ (a∅, 1)
x¯ : (x, 3) ≻ (a¯x, 3) ≻ (b¯x, 1) ≻ (a¯x, 2) ≻ (a∅, 1)
Notice that the preferences of each triple contains a cyclic re-
lation, and hence in a core stable assignment, there are only
two possible case: first, all the three players x1, x2, and x
are assigned to x, and players x¯1, x¯2, and x¯ are assigned to
activities x¯1 , x¯2, and b¯x, respectively; second, all the play-
ers x¯1, x¯2, and x¯ are assigned to x, and players x1, x2, and
x are assigned to activities x1, x2, and bx, respectively.
For each clause c ∈ C where c = ℓc1 ∨ ℓc2 ∨ ℓc3, the pref-
erences for clause players c1, c2, and c3 are again cyclic and
given as follows:
c1 : (ℓ
c
1, 2) ≻ (a∅, 1),
c2 : (ℓ
c
2, 2) ≻ (ℓ
c
1, 2) ≻ (ℓ
c
3, 2) ≻ (a∅, 1),
c3 : (ℓ
c
3, 2) ≻ (ℓ
c
1, 1) ≻ (ℓ
c
2, 2) ≻ (a∅, 1).
If there exists a core stable outcome, it must be the case that
at least one of the literal activities ℓc1, ℓc2, and ℓc3 must be
used outside of the three players c1, c2, and c3; otherwise,
no feasible assignment would be core stable.
Now we will show that φ is satisfied by some truth assign-
ment if and only if there is a core stable feasible assignment.
Suppose that there exists a truth assignment that satisfies
φ. We construct a core stable feasible assignment π as fol-
lows. First, for each variable x that is set to True, we as-
sign positive literal activities x1, x2, and bx to positive literal
players x1, x2, and a variable player x, respectively, and as-
sign a variable activity x to players x¯1, x¯2, and x¯. For each
variable x that is set to False, we assign negative literal activ-
ities x¯1, x¯2, and b¯x to negative literal players x¯1, x¯2, and a
variable player x¯, respectively, and assign a variable activity
x to players x1, x2, and x. Note that this procedure uses at
least one of the literal activities ℓc1, ℓc2 and ℓc3 of each clause
c, since the given truth assignment satisfies φ. Then, for each
clause c ∈ C, we assign activities by constructing a digraph
with vertices being potential assignments and identifying an
“undominated” activity. Let
Vc = {(ℓ
c
1, {c1, c2}), (ℓ
c
2, {c2, c3}), (ℓ
c
1, {c3}), (ℓ
c
3, {c2, c3})},
and delete fromVc vertices whose activities ℓcj are already as-
signed to some players. Then, orient from (a, S) to (b, T ) if
there exists a common player cj ∈ S∩T who strictly prefers
(a, |S|) to (b, |T |). This digraph is acyclic since at least one
of the literal activities ℓc1, ℓc2, and ℓc3 has been already as-
signed to some literal players. If the digraph is empty, i.e.,
all the activities are already assigned in a previous step, we
assign the void activity to all the clause players c1, c2, and
c3. Otherwise, we assign the activity of a source vertex of
the digraph to its coalition and the void activity to the rest.
The resulting assignment π of players to activities is core sta-
ble, because no variable and literal player wishes to change
their alternative and no connected subset of each Nc cannot
strongly block π.
Conversely, suppose that there exists a core stable feasible
assignment π. By core stability, for each variable x ∈ X ,
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either a pair of positive literal activities x1 and x2 or a pair
of negative literal activities x¯1 and x¯2 should be assigned
to the corresponding pair of literal players; further, for each
clause c, at least one of the literal activities ℓc1, ℓc2, and ℓc3
should be played outside of the clause players c1, c2, and c3.
Then, take the truth assignment that sets the variables x to
True if their positive literal players x1 and x2 are assigned
to positive literal activities x1 and x2; otherwise, x is set to
False; this can be easily seen to satisfy φ.
Our FPT result for graphs with small connected components
can also be adapted to the core. In contrast, our approach for
Nash stability for paths and stars does not seem to generalize
to core stability, and we leave these cases for future work.
Theorem 13. There exists an algorithm that given an in-
stance of gGASP checks whether it has a core stable fea-
sible assignment, finds one if it exists, and runs in time
O(pc+18pkn2), where c is the maximum size of the con-
nected components and k is the number of connected com-
ponents.
Proof. We give a dynamic programming. Suppose
our graph (N,L) has k connected components
(N1, L1), (N2, L2), . . . , (Nk, Lk). For each i = 1, 2, . . . , k,
each set B ⊆ A∗ of activities assigned to N , and each set
B′ ⊆ B of activities assigned to
⋃i
j=1Nj , we denote by
fi(B,B
′) whether there is an assignment of
⋃i
j=1Nj that
gives rise to a core stable outcome. Specifically, fi(B,B′)
is true if and only if there exists an individually rational
feasible assignment π :
⋃i
j=1Nj → A such that
• π only uses the activities in B′, i.e., πb 6= ∅ for all b ∈ B′
and πb = ∅ for all b ∈ A∗ \B′, and
• no connected subset S ⊆
⋃i
j=1Nj together with activity
in B′ ∪ (A∗ \B) strongly blocks π.
For i = 1, each B ⊆ A∗, and B′ ⊆ B, we compute the
value of f1(B,B′) by trying all possible mappings π : N →
B′ ∪ {a∅}, and check whether it is an individually rational
feasible assignment using all activities inB′ and such that no
connected subset S ⊆ N1 together with activity inB′∪(A∗\
B) strongly blocks π. For i ≥ 2 from i = 2, 3, . . . , k, each
B ⊆ A∗, andB′ ⊆ B, we set fi(B,B′) to true if there exists
a bipartition of B′ into P and Q such that fi−1(B,P ) is true
and there exists an individually rational feasible assignment
π : Ni → Q∪{a∅} such that each activity inQ is assigned to
some player inNi, and no connected subset S ⊆ Ni together
with activity in Q ∪ (A∗ \ B) strongly blocks π. It is not
difficult to see that a core stable solution exists if and only if
fk(B,B) for some B ⊆ A∗. If this is the case, such a stable
feasible assignment can be found using standard dynamic
programming techniques. The bound on the running time is
immediate.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have initiated the study of group activity
selection problems with network structure, and found that
even for very simple families of graphs computing stable out-
comes is NP-hard. We identified several ways to circumvent
this computational intractability. For gGASPs with copyable
activities, we showed that there exists a polynomial time al-
gorithm to compute stable outcomes, and for gGASPs with
few activities, we provided fixed parameter algorithms for
restricted classes of networks.
We leave several interesting questions for future work.
Our fixed-parameter tractability results can be extended to
more general graph families, such as graphs with bounded
pathwidth and graphs with a bounded number of internal
nodes. However, for general graphs, the exact parameterized
complexity of determining the existence of stable outcomes
is unknown. When the underlying graph is complete, one
can adapt techniques of Darmann et al. (2012) to show that
the problem of computing Nash stable outcomes is in XP
with respect to p; for other networks, including trees, it is
not even clear whether our problem is in XP with respect to
p. It would be also interesting to investigate the parameter-
ized complexity of gGASPs using other parameters.
Another promising research direction is to study ana-
logues of other solution concepts from the hedonic games
literature for gGASPs; in particular, it would be interesting
to understand the complexity of computing individually sta-
ble outcomes in gGASPs.
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